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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD JACQUES, by and 
through his g u a r d i an, ad litem, 
Pauline Murphy, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
D ALL AS F ARRIMOND, by and 
through his guardian .ad litem, Tho-
mas Smith Farrimond and THOMAS 
~MITH F ARRIMOND, personally, 
Defendants-R.espondents. 
RESPONDEN'TS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
9724 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an .action by plaintiff against defendant, 
under the guest statute, to recover damages for personal 
injuries sustained in a one car accident. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was submitted to the jury on special inte~r­
rogatories on wlrieh the jury found that defendant was 
guilty of intoxication and wilful misconduct, both of 
which contributed to cause the accident, and further 
found that the plaintiff was guilty of assumption of risk. 
The trial court entered judgment on: the verdict in favor 
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of defendants, no caus.e of action. Plaintiff's motion 
for new trial, or for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek .an affirmance o.f the judgment 
below. 
SrTATEMEN1T OF FAOT8 
The statements of facts contained in appellant's 
brief is wholly inadequate to inform the court as to the 
background out of which the case arises, or as to the 
evidence upon which the jury's findings were bas.ed. 
There was conflicting evidence relative to each of the 
issues of fact submitted to the jury for determination. 
Because we admit that the· findings of the jury relative 
to intoxication and wilful misconduct on the part of the 
defendant are supported by competent evidence, and we 
raise· no issue on those questions he·re, we do not detail 
the evidence in support thereof. Likewise, under familiar 
principles, the jury's finding that plaintiff assumed the 
risk must be affirmed if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. It is not necessary to review all of 
the evidence, but simply that which supports the jury's 
findings, which was abundant. 
In this brief, we shall refer to the parties as they 
appeared in the court below. The word "defendant" re-
fers to the defendant driver, Dallas Farrimond, except 
where specifically indicated differently. 
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Plaintiff .and defendant, and five of their comrades 
were involved in an accident on the evening of January 
-l, 1961. (R. 122, 148, 177, 217 244.) These seven high 
sc-hool aged boys were close personal friends, "ran 
around" together almost continuously, and it was their 
enstom to go driving around .almost every evening. (R. 
l:j:~. 25-!, 260, 339-340). Although only teen-aged, none 
of them were strangers to the use of alcohol. (R. 139, 
];)9, 1():2, 188-9, 196, 229, 252, 317, 344, 348). All of them 
admitted that they had used alcohol; that they had seen 
other members of the party use alcohol on other occa-
sions, .and that they knew and understood the effects of 
alcohol on the human body. (R. 139, 162, 163, 188, 189, 
196, 230, 252-253, 344, 348). Plaintiff admitted on cross.-
examination that he knew and understood the effects of 
alcohol on the human body, and specifically that he knew 
it was not safe to ride in an automobile with someone 
who had been drinking. (R. 252, 253). 
On the evening of the accident, the defendant picked 
up the other six boys, and after riding around awhile, 
they went to the House of Pizza. (R. 122-123, 148, 177, 
202, :218, 245, 316, 327, 341). The plaintiff was the first 
of the passengers picked up by the defendant. (R. 12·2, 
135, 177' 2-!5). 
All seven boys testified at the trial, and all of them, 
except Glen Ulmer, testified that there was no drinking 
of alcoholic beverages prior to the time they arrived at 
the House of Pizza. (R. 123, 136, 149, 157, 161, 177, 191, 
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220, 227, 250, 326). IDmer testified that .although there 
was no evidence that any of the boys had been drinking 
prior to the time that they picked him up, there was a 
]Jqttle passed around in the car, and there was drinking 
during the time tha.t they drove out to Murray to pick up 
Gorringe, and also on their return up to the time they 
arrived at the House. of Pizza. (R. 341, 351-352). 
Although plaintiff denied having anything to drink 
on the evening of the accident, and denied knowledge of 
any drinking by defendant, and in fa.ct denied seeing any 
alcoholic beverages at all, (R. 2'46, 2,50), his te1stimony 
was contradicted by every other member of the party. 
Several of the boys testified that one of their party, 
Ligaros, obtained a one-fifth bottle, partly filled with 
gin, from som.e acquaintances inside the House 'Of Pizz-a, 
which he presented to the occupants. of the car. (R. 123, 
124, 178, 187, 2·27). This was mixed with some mixer, 
which the boys conveniently had available, and was con-
sumed by plaintiff, defendant, and Ligaros. (R. 135, 
178, 219, 228, 327, 332, 343, 351). Although Richard Rhead 
did not actually see any part of the contents of the bottle 
consumed, he did see the bottle, and assumed that some 
of the boys dr.ank it, because that would he the usual 
thing for them to do. (R. 162-163). There was no evi-
dence that any of the other four drank any part of the 
liquor, erxcept that one of the boys admitted that he 
tasted it and didn't like it. (R. 150, 158, 228, 2.29, 343). 
The boys remained at the House of Pizza. for ap-
proximately an hour. (R. 149, 158). During this time, 
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hPsides engaging in what drinking they did, they talked 
with some girls inside the· House of Pizza, (R. 202, 316, 
379), and engaged in a dough fight amon'gst themselves; 
and decor.ated the automobile of one of the girls with 
dough. (R. 126, 136, 150, 196). Before they finally de-
parted the House of Pizza, on the trip that resulted in 
the accident, plaintiff and one of the other boys took 
defendant's car and drove to Rhead'shome; (R. 181-182·, 
195, ~31, 329). Another time plaintiff drove the car and 
all seven of them rode around a few blocks, and then 
came hack to the IIouse· of Pizza. (R. 19·6, 2.30, 329). 
During this time defendant was sitting in the back s.eat .. 
(R. 230, 329-330). There was .also evidence that while de-
fendant was in the House of Pizza talking to his girl 
friend, the rest of the1 boys drove his car away but they 
can1e back later and picked him up. (R. 32.2.-323, 382, 384). 
Besides the testimony of plaintiff's own companions 
as to his drinking, the.re was. testimony by two girls who 
saw him inside the House of Pizz-a, to the effect that he 
had been drinking, and that others of the boys had also 
been drinking. (R. 317, 380, 381, 392, 39·3). The investi-
gating officer detected the odor of ·alcohol on piaintif'f"s 
breath while he was attempting to render first aid to him 
at the scene of the accident. (R. 111). 
There was testimony that the influence· of alcohol on 
defendant was observed at the time the boys finally left 
the House of Pizza. (R. 222-223, 230, 328, 343, 345, 352). 
Dwight Tolley testified that defendant was ''acting 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
goofy", and that he was "pretty drunk." (R. 223). IDmer 
testified that he, was "pretty well gone," (R. 345), and 
Gorringe testified that defendant and plaintiff were 
messing around and that they were aoting the same. 
(R. 328). Both were acting different from normal. (R. 
328). 
Although appellant claims that defendant was 
angered by the fact that his girl friend wa~ at the House 
of Pizza in another boy's. car, and suspected that she 
intended to marry him, the: record citations in appellant's 
brief do not support the claim. In faet, the,re is very little 
evidence in the record to sustain it, principally the testi-
mony of plaintiff"s mother and stepfather, that at the 
hospital defendant said in their presence, that he had a 
fight with his girl friend. (R. 257, 2?1). However, both 
defendant and his girl friend denied that there had been 
.a fight or argument of any kind, or that defendant was in 
any way upset. (R. 180, 315-316). The testimony was 
also refuted by defendant's parents. (R. 372-373, 401, 
.411). None of his companions noticed his being upset or 
anything unusual, and none of them was aware of any 
trouble between defendant a.nd his girl friend. (R. 216, 
263, 365, 367). There' was considerable evidence that he 
was happ~, gay and having a good time. (R. 203, 205, 
230, 231, 328). 
In summary, the jury found that defendant was in-
toxicated, ·and that his intoxication was a cause of the 
accident. (R. 81-83, 45~6-457, 461-462). There is abundant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
evidence that all of the drinking which defendant did on 
th~ evening of the' .accident, was done· after he picked up 
the plaintiff (R. 123, 136, 149, 157, 161, 177, 191, 220, 227, 
250, 326) ; that all of the drinking done: by defendant was 
d..one in the presence of the plaintiff (R. 191, 220, 236}; 
that plaintiff was fully aware of the drinking done by 
defendant .and was aware of the effect that the drinking 
would have on defendant (R. 191, 220, 252-253); that 
plaintiff had on previous occasions seen defendant when 
he had been consuming alcoholic beverages (R. 252}; 
that plaintiff imbibed equally with the defendant and 
participated freely and equally with him in the pleasures 
of the evening (R. 135, 178, 191, 2:19, 228, 327, 332., 343, 
351); that the effects of the alcohol upon defendant we-re 
obvious and were observed before the time the boys. left 
the House of Pizza (R. 222, 223; 230, 328, 343, 345, 352); 
that there were four boys in the car that had had nothing 
whatsoever to drink and· were fit and able to drive, hut; 
none of them offered to drive or insisted upon driving 
(R. 150, 158, 228, 229, 343); that the House of Pizza from 
which the party departed was a ''hangout'' for teenagers, 
where they met their friends, and where it may be fairly 
assumed none of them would have any difficulty in ob-, 
taining .a ride from another friend, if they did not care 
to ride with defendant in his then condition .. The evi-
dence was that the other boys felt free to take defen-
dant's car and that they did in fact do so. (R. 181-182, 
195,.1~6, 230-231, 329). There is also abundant evidence 
that at no time i~ the course of the ride did plaintiff in 
any,Yise protest the manner in which defendant was 
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driving, nor did he ask to he let out of the car. (R. 131, 
232, 330, 331, 346, 347). On the contra.ry, when the other 
boys requested the defendant to slow down, plaintiff ex-
horted him to go faste-r. (R. 191, 330, 346, 369). Not 
only was the jury's finding of assumption of risk ampJy 
supported by the evidence, hut the evidence would hardly 
permit any other inference. 
It should also be noted that neither at the time the 
case was submitted to the jury, nor at ,any subsequent 
time, did plaintiff ever take exception to the verdict 
forms, or to the submission of the case to the jury on 
special interrogatories.. 
ARGUMENT' 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN SUB-
MITTING THE ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF AS-
SUMPTION OF RISK, TO THE JURY ON SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES. 
Rule 49, specfically authorizes the submission of 
issues of fact to the jury on special verdicts in the form 
of special written interrogatories on each issue of fact, 
rather than upon a general verdict : 
"'The court may require a jury to return only 
a special verdict in the form of a special written 
finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the 
court may submit to the jury written interroga-
tories susceptible of categorical or other brief 
answer or may submit mitten forms of the 
several special findings which might properly be 
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1nade under the pleadings .and evidence; or it 
may use such other method of submitting the 
issues and requiring the written findings thereon 
as it deems most appropriate. * * *" 
Where a rase is submitted on special findings it then 
becomes the duty of the court to apply the law to the 
detmmined facts and direct the appropriate judgment. 
~Pe Rule 58 A : 
"* * * If there is a special verdict ... pursu-
ant to rule 49, the court shall direct the appro-
priate judgment which shall be forthwith signed 
by the clerk and filed." 
The use of special interrogatories w.a.s not an inno-
vation of the new rules, nor was it a stranger to our code 
practice. On the . contrary, this procedural device has 
been used through the history of the state, extending. 
back into territorial days. Its use has been known to the 
common law for centuries. It has uniformly been held 
that whether the case should be submitted to the jury on 
a general verdict, or on a special verdict, or on a general 
verdict with special interrogatories, is a matter within 
the sole discretion of the trial court, and in the absence 
of a sho·wing of an abuse of discretion, the losing party. 
has no grolmd of appeal. 53 Am. Jur. 736-7, Trial§ 1064. 
See .also 5 :Moore's Federal Practice 2204, § 49.03: 
• 'lT nder Rule -!9 (a) the court has complete 
discretion as to \Yhether a special or general ver-
dict is to be returned. As with othe'r discretionary 
acts, this should not be reviewable, except, per-
haps, for gross abuse, which could rarely be 
shown." 
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In Smith vs. Ireland, 4 Ut. 187, 7 P. 749, the terri-
torial court said : 
"It was within the· discretion of the court to 
direct a general or special veTdict, or special as 
to the controverted facts and general -as to those 
not controve·rted on the trial.'' 
That rule has been consistently followed since that 
time. Se1e Mangum v. Bullion Beck & Champion Min. Co., 
15 Ut. 34, 50 P. 834, and Genter v. Conglomerate Min. Co., 
23 Ut. 165, 64 P. 362. 
In Prye v. Kalbaugh, 34 Ut. 306, 97 P. 331, this court 
said: 
"We think under the statute it w,as within the 
discretion of the court to submit or refuse to 
submit the particular questions of fact requested, 
and that error cannot be imputed to the trial court 
without a showing of an abuse of discretion." 
See .also Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Smart 
Land & Livestock Co., 43 Ut. 554, 137 P. 837, and Berg v. 
Otis Elevator Co., 64 Ut. 518, 231 P. 832. 
A more recent case is Baker v. Cook, 6 Ut.2d 161, 
308 P .2:d 264. There, as here~, the losing party made no 
objection or exception to the submission of the case to 
the jury on special interrogatories, or to the form of the 
questions. 'There, as here, complaint was made to there-
viewing court for the first ti1ne. The language of this 
court in that case is singularly applicable here: 
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''But defendant neither objected nor excepted 
to the form of questions and counsel cannot sit 
back and permit the court to submit the proposi-
tions and object if the verdict is unfavorable. 
• • • After the case was submitted the jury re-
turned to ask the court what would happen if 
they answered 'yes' in both questions 1 und 2. 
Neither before the jury was charged, nor in the 
exceptions taken after the jury left to deliberate, 
nor when the jury came in for further instruc-
tions, did defendant suggest that the propositions 
were confusing and should be clarified. Never 
until the proposition was pres,ented to this court 
was it urged that the propositions were confusing. 
If the defendant felt that the questions were so 
drawn as to confuse the jury, request should 
have been made to clarify the questions, partic-
ularly when the jury came back to see what 
would happen if they answered questions 1 and 
2, 'ye~s'." 
And in apparently the most recent expression on the 
subject, this court said in Ranks v. Chr~stensen, 11 Ut. 2d 
8, 35± P. 2d 564: 
"It is elementary that there is no impropriety 
in submitting special interrogatories if the court 
so desires." 
Plaintiff has cited not a single case or text to sup-
port his contention that the court erred in submitting the 
ease to the jury on special interrogatories. He has 
quoted from the record as to certain conversations be-
tween the court and members of the jury before the 
verdict was finally received. Although he now complains 
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as to the special interrogatories, he: did not at that time 
by motion, objection, exception, or otherwise, indicate to 
the court that he had any objection whatsoever to the 
manner in which the court proceeded. No abuse of dis-
cretion has been shown. AppeHant's first point is entirely 
without merit. 
POINT II. 
BY PARTICIPATING WITH THE DEFENDANT IN 
THE DRINKING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, AND BY 
RIDING WITH HIM WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
LIQUOR THAT HE HAD CONSUMED, PLAINTIFF VOLUN-
TARILY ASSUMED THE RISK OF ANY MISHAP RESULT-
ING FROM DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATED CONDITION. 
Plaintiff apparently contends that one may freely 
and without penalty elect to ride with a driver known to 
have been drinking and obviously physically impaired to 
drive, and after having done so, to .assess against the 
driver any loss sustained by the rider as a result of the 
driver's own impaired condition. Such clearly is not and 
never has been the law. 
In 5 A Am. J ur., page 739, Automobiles, Sec. 792, 
the rule is stated as follows: 
''Reason and authority alike support the· rule 
that i'f a person voluntarily rides in an .automobile 
driven by one who is intoxicated, and whom the· 
passenger knows, or, under the circumstances, 
should have known was intoxicated, he is pre-
cluded from recovering from the driver for in-
juries sustained in .an accident if the intoxicated 
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condition of the driver was the proximate cause 
or one of the proximate causes of the accident in 
which the plaintiff was injured. * * * The cases 
which have applied the doctrine of .assumption of 
risk to guest actions hold that where· the guest had 
knowledge, or should know, of the intoxicated 
condition of the driver, then. the guest is deemed 
to have assumed the risk of riding with his host.'' 
See also -! BlashfiJeld, Cyclopedia of Automobile La.w 
and Pra.ctice, Sec. 2512, p. 716: 
"Likewise, one voluntarily riding with a 
drunken driver assumes the risk arising from 
such driving, especially where the guest volun-
tarily becomes intoxicated himself." 
See also 2 H.arper and J,ames, the Law of Torts, 
page 1171, and Restatement of Torts §§ 482(2) and 
§ 503(2). ·The same rule is stated in the principal author-
ity cited .and relied upon by appellant, 44 A. L. R. 2d 
13-!2, 1343 : 
"To the extent that the doctrine of 'assump-
tion of risk' has been accepted as .a defense in 
other than master-and-servant or other contract 
situations, 1nost of the courts have held that a 
guest who voluntarily assumes the risk of injury 
from his host's wilful or wanton misconduct, gross 
negligence, or intoxication, cannot recover for 
the injuries to the infliction of which he has, in 
effect, assented." 
The rules as stated by the textwriters are fully sup-
ported by the decisions. 
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In House v. Schmelzer, (Cal. App.), 40 P.2d 577, the 
court said at page 579: 
''While an innocent person is entitled to pro-
tection from intoxicated drivers and to redress 
for injuries caused by them, one who accepts a 
ride under drcumst,ances which should be a suf-
ficient warning to any reasonable person that the 
.driver is not in a fit condiJtion to operate his car 
has no just c.ause fo!r compZaimt when the law 
leaves him where he f't'nds himself." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The court of last resort o.f the State of Kentucky, 
the home of Bourbon vVhiskey, has, as might be antici-
·pated, had occasion to treat the problem here involved in 
many cases. That court, apparently fully acquainted with 
the frequent results of mixing gasoline and alcohol, has 
consistently and repeatedly affirmed the general prin-
ciple that one who elects to ride with a driver known to 
have been drinking to ·a substantial extent, is barred 
fron1 reeovery if an accident ensues resulting in whole or 
in part from the driver's impaired condition. One of the 
earliest decisions was in the case of Winston's AdmirtiJs-
trator v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 2.20, 200 SW 330, 
where the court said .at p. 332 of 200 S.W.: 
"Winston and Nunnelly were associated to-
gether for some hours o:ri the evening of the aooi-
dent, and had been in and about restaurants and 
saloons. together. . . Winston was fully acquainted 
with Nunnelly's intoxicated condition if he was 
intoxicated; he knew all of the facts or·had the 
opportunity of knowimg them before he entered 
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the car, and is therefore charged with that 
knowledge. • • '"'" (Emphasis ours.) 
The principles there laid down have been consis-
tently followed. In Rennold's A.dmtnistratrix v. Wag-
gener, 271 Ky. 300, 111 S.W. 2d 647, the court said at 
page 649 of 111 SW2d: 
"It is an established rule in this jurisdiction 
that a person who enters an automobile as a guest 
with knowledge that the driver is intoxicated to 
an extent that renders him careless or indifferent 
to his own safety or the safety of others, or in-
competent to properly operate the automobile, is 
guilty of contributory negligence·, and that the 
guest assumes the risks tncident to the oper,ation 
of the automobile by a dn'ver in such condition. 
"It has been a subject of comment by this 
court that as a matter of common knowledge the 
use of intoxicants begets a spirit of recklessness 
and that their use to an .appreciable degree of 
intoxication so disturbs the normal volitional and 
reflex powers as to render a driver of an auto-
mobile inc.apable of responding with the precision, 
judgment, and accuracy necessary to a proper and 
safe operation of an automobile.'' (Emphasis 
ours.) 
In JJfakin'.s Adm'r. v. J.l!IcLelland, 279 Ky. 59·5, 131 
S.W.2d 478, the court said: 
"The principal controversy before us in-
volves the question as to whether or not Jessie 
Makin knew that McLellan was drnnk when she 
entered his car. If she did, she ·assumed the risk 
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when she got in the car to ride into Louisville 
with McLellan.'' 
To the same effect see Toppass v. Perkt"ns, 268 Ky. 
186, 104 SW2d 423; Spt"vey's Admtnistratrix v. Hack-
worth, 304 Ky. 141, 200 SW2d 131; Spencer v. Boes, 305 
Ky. 573, 205 SW2d 150; Irby v. Williams, 313 Ky. 353, 
231 SW2d 1; LewiJs v. Perkins, 313 Ky. 847, 233 SW2d 
985 and J(avanaugh v. Myers' Administratrix, (Ky.), 
246 SW2d 461. 
Another court which has had frequent occasion to 
pass on the same problem is that of Louisiana. In 
Richa.rd v. Canning, (La. App.), 158 So. 598, 599, that 
court used language singularly appropriate to the case 
at bar: 
''Canning's condition must have been ohv:ious. 
He a'YIAd Richard had been together for several 
hours, and though, at the various homes at which 
they had visited, they may have been separated 
for a few moments, they were suffiJC'Vently to-
gether for Richard to have become fully aware 
of the fact that his friend was imbibimg freely 
of intoxicating liquors." (Emphasis ours.) 
In the case of Mercier v. FiJdelity & Casualty Com-
pany of New York, (L.a. App.), 10 So. 2d 262, 264, the 
court said: 
"They [plaintiff and defendant] drank freely 
and continuously, each to the knowledge of the 
other, and both knew that they were under its 
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influPneP. . . Plaintiff had enough experience in 
life to discern when one was sober, or under the 
influence of liquor, .and was thus able to appre-
ciate danger and risk of continuing to drink and 
over-indulge with one whom he knew would oper-
ate the automobile in returning to their homes. 
He knew, or should have known, that by exces-
sive drinking, Furey would be deprived of his 
normal f,aculties and be unable to exercise the 
ordinaffy care and oaut~on possessed by one when 
sober. H,e knew, or should have known, all of the 
[,acts, and had full opportwmity of knowing them 
before continuing with his revelry. TheiJr con-
t,i.n.ued drinktng was of ,sufficient importance to 
ca,nse an apprehension of d~anger and an .anticiJp(J)-
tion and realizatvon of the peril in which he was 
voltttntwrily entering.· One cannot close his eyes 
to obvious danger, or entrust his s,afety absolute-
ly to the driver of an ,automobile when the same 
knowledge of obvious or thre1atened danger is 
possessed by both. Experiencing the exhiliration 
. and sensations incident to the swirl and dash of 
a 1nixture of intoxicating liquor and rapid trans-
it, plaintiff assumed the risks of ,danger attendant 
thereto.* * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
And in Elba v. Thom.as, (La. App.), 59 So. 2d 732, 
736, the same court said : 
''This court can take judicial notice of what 
i::-: common knowledge and human experience. 
Anyone who has indulged in alcoholic beverages 
kno-ws that it dulls perception ·and reflexes to 
the extent that one cannot react normally to im-
pending emergencies and dangers.'' 
To the same effect: Livaudai.s v. Black, (La.. App.), 
127 So.129; CHnton v. City of West Mon.roe, (La. App.), 
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187 So. 561; Will~s v. City of West Monroe, (La. App.), 
187 So. 829; Madden v. City of West Monroe, (La. App.), 
187 So. 829; and Perritt v. City of West Monroe, (La. 
App.), 187 So. 830. 
In Aycock v. Green, (Tex. Civ. App.), 94 SW2d 894, 
898, the· court said : 
"The: record at large', raises the constantly 
recurring question of whether a willing and ac-
tive participant, such as the decedent in this case, 
can be heard to complain of fortuitous circum-
stances occurring to him in an escapade of this 
nature, in which all the participants join, delihe·r-
ately and voluntarily, with equal zest and with 
full knowledge of its possibilities for an unhappy 
ending. Our courts have many times held, with 
obvious reason, that in such cases a victim of the 
folly (or his unfortunate survivors) cannot re-
cover of his fellow whom he had joined whole-
heartedly in producing the very result which all 
had equal opportunity of foreseeing and avoid-
ing." 
To the same effect see Sclviller v. Rice, ('Tex.), 246 
SW2d 607, and Mooneyhan v. Benedict, (Tex. Civ. App.), 
284 SW2d 7 41. 
In Hicks v. Herbert, 173 Tenn. 1, 113 SW2d 1197, 
1199, the court said in a case .analogous to the one at bar: 
"It was not necessary for the defendant, 
relying on plaintiff's contributory negligence, to 
prove actual knowledge of defendant's intoxica-
tion on the part of plaintiff. If an ordinarily 
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prudent man under the circumstances w~e have 
related would have regarded defendant as m-
toxicated and appredated h~ condition, such 
knowleJdge and appreciation must be imputed to 
pla~ntvff. 
"Plarmtiff was in a position to see just as 
much of defendant and of defend,ant's condition 
as were the other witnesses test~fyilng in the 
case ... 
''We think the record discloses a case· in 
which it appears 'that reasonable men, acting as 
the triers. of the fact, would find, without any 
reasonable probability of differing in their views, 
either that the plaintiff lmew and appreciated 
the danger or that ordinarily prudent men, under 
the same circumstances would readily acquire 
such knowledge and appreciation. . . ' " (Empha-
sis ours.) 
Se'e also Schwartz v. J olvnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280 
~\V2d 32. 
A leading case from Iowa is Garrity v. Mangan, 
(Ia.), 6 NW2d 292. The court there said .at p. 295: 
"Although the distinction has been made by 
our courts at various times, it seems to us rea-
sonable ·and clear that one who enters a car .as a 
guest, lmowing that the driver is under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor should be deemed 
to take his chances of an accident and resulting 
injury, .and such has been the holding of various 
courts. 
"In the instant case, under the evidence, the 
fact remains that defendant's decedent was either 
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intoxicated or he was not. If not, there would be 
rio cause of action. Under the uncontradicted 
evidence, if he was 2'ntox~cated it must have been 
obviJous to his companion, who was with h2m all 
the evening previous to the .accident . .. ; the doc-
trine of assumption of r~k would .apply, and Vt 
would be held ~as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff's decedent assumed the risk of riding wt"th a 
drunken dr:ive.r. In either event, there could be 
no recovery." (E.mphasis ours.) 
In Booth vs. General Mills, 243 Ia. 206, 49 NW2d 561, 
the· same court said : 
"It is appellant's claim that .at the time plain-
tiff entered defendant's car, just shortly before 
the fatal accident, he knew or should have known 
that Shocklee w.as intoxicated. Where the facts 
clearly show such a situation, there can be no 
recovery . . ."' 
Se:e also HelmiJng v. People's National Bank, (Ia.), 
220 NW 45. 
In the· West Virginia case of Hurt v. Gwimm, 95 SE2d· 
248, 251, the court s.aid: 
''The evidence before us leaves no doubt 
that the three persons who took the drive in de-
fendant's automobile ... to the place where the 
accident occurred, had been drinking intoxicating 
liquor prior to the commencement of the drive, 
each havtng knowlBdge of the drtnking by the 
others . .. It is not questioned that each of the 
three voluntarily entered into the venture of the 
drive .and the hazards thereof. . . It cannot be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
doubted in such circumstances, that each of the 
parties was fully cognizant of the hazards of 
such a dr.ive from the time of commenc:ement 
thereof. A guest passenger voluntarily following 
such a course of known hazardous conduct, 
fraught with strong possibility of the very type 
of the accident which occurred, cannot be per-
mitted to recover merely because she had no op-
portunity to escape injury after the accident 
began to take place - in the instant case after 
the automobile of defendant began to skid." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
In Stekovich v. U. 8., (M.D. Pa), 102 F. Supp. 925, 
926, the court said : 
"Where a passenger .accompanies the driver 
of an automobile, knowing of the driver's drimk-
iu,rJ, and is injured through negligence of the 
driver, brought about by the alcohol he has taken, 
such passenger assumes the risk of voluntarily 
riding vdth him." (Emphasis ours.) 
In Taylor v. Taug, (Wash.), 136 P.2d 175, the Su-
preme Court of \V ashington said at page 180: 
"That the drinking of intoxicating liquor 
effectually destroys the faculties essential to safe 
driving is of such common knowledge that no one 
with sense will submit to the peril of riding with 
a driver who has recently consumed liquor. Any-
one who submits to that peril assumes the riJsk 
attendant upon the journey and is guilty of con-
tributory negligence \Yhich precludes recovery. 
Appellant was a high school gr:aduate and cer-
tainly must have appreciJated the danger of rid-
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ing iln a car driven by one whom she had jUst seen 
drinklng ilntox:icattng liquor." (Emphasis ours.) 
And in conclusion the court further said at p. 180: 
"Rerri. Rev. Stat. Sec. 6.360-119', provides: 'It 
shall he unlawful for any person to operate any 
vehicle upon the public highway of this state 
while under the influence of or affected by the 
use of intoxic-ating liquor . . . " 
"We have held that one driving in violation 
of this statute is guilty of negligence per se ... 
"By the same reasoning, we must hold that 
one who voluntarily rides with such .a driver 
assumes the risk of the venture· and contributes 
to the injury. This conclusion is borne· out hy 
the statement we have quoted from Parker v. 
Taylor, supra. Th~s accident w.as simply the 
af.termath of ,a drinking party, a;nd while appel-
lant did not drink intoxicattng liquor, she cer-
t.atnly knew that liquor w.as being consumed by 
the driver and others Vn his company. 
''We hold that appellarnt assumed the risk 
(J)tten,aant upon the journey, and that she was 
guilty of contributory negligence." (Emphasis· 
ours.) 
See to the some effeet Hemington v. Hemington, 221 
Mich. 206, 190 NW 683. 
In Packard v. Quesnel, 112 Vt. 175, 22 A2d 164, the 
court said: 
''Reason and authority alike support the rule 
·that if a person voluntarily rides in an automobile 
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driven by one who is intoxicated and the passen-
ger knows, or under the' circumstances should have 
known, the intoxicated condition of the driver, he 
is precluded from recovering from such driver or 
a third person for injuries sustained in an acci-
dent if the intoxicated condition of the driver was 
the proximate cause or one of the proximate 
rauses of the accident producing the injuries in 
question. • • *'' 
In a recent case from Colorado, the Supreme Court 
of that state said at p. 600 of 309' P.2d : 
"From the facts herein related, which are un-
disputed, to the effect that plaintiff participated 
in what we will call,a drinking party on the even-
ing of the accident and imbibed freely from the 
intoxicating liquor that was about her before 
leaving on the trip during which the accident 
occurred, that she went so far as to offer some of 
her liquor to the driver, that she knew the driver 
and her companions were in a state of intoxica-
tion before starting on the disastrous journey, it 
is clear that plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
and a.ssrttmed the risk of whatever might happen 
"~hen she entered defendant's automobile with 
the other intoxicated occupants and continued on 
the trip in a party where sobriety was wholly 
absent. The motion for a directed verdict bas.ed 
upon the grounds just enumerated, should have 
been sustained and error of the trial court at-
tached. 
"Plaintiff while legally a minor, was 19 years 
old and possessed of the usual and ordinary 
faculties of an adult person and it may be as-
sumed that she was fully capable of knowing, or 
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could anticipate, danger that might follow from 
the operation of the car due to the physical in-
capacity of the driver, and she made no effort to 
avoid the likelihood of the accident and it must he· 
said ·that she assumed the risk, which bars her 
recovery." (Emphasis. ours.) Hiller v. Gross, 
(Colo.), 309 P.2d 598. 
In the earlier case of United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of Americ.a, Local Union No. 55 v. 
Salter, (Golo.), 167 P.2d 9·54, the same court said: 
"·The effect of intoxicating liquor in depriv-
ing a driver of care and caution and inducing 
physical incapacity in the operation of a car is 
universally known and tragically illustrated 
almost daily. Where' one becomes a guest and im-
prudently enters a car with knowledge that the 
driver is so· under the influence of intoxicants as 
to tend to prevent him from exercising the care 
and caution which a sober and prudent man would 
employ in the operation and control of the car, the 
guest is barred from recovery by reason of his 
contributory negligence, and as having assumed 
the risk involved. Where the evidence of such 
fact is_ without conflict, plaintiff is barred from 
recovery as a matter of law. * * * Where the 
evidenc~ is. sufficient to raise a question as to 
plaintiff's knowledge~ and prudence, the determi-
nation of that issue must be submitted to the 
jury or other trier of facts. 
"It is a matter of_ common knowledge, that 
whatever may be the result in a particular case, 
the drinking of intoxicating liquors generally in-
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tarily becoming the guest of a driver who has 
been drinking intoxicants is analogous to becom-
ing the guest of an operator who is lrnown to have 
been a negligent driver. 
''Where the guest has knowledge of substan-
tial drinking of intoxicating liquor by the driver 
and there is evidence tending to show that such 
drinking was a contributing cause of the driver's 
negligence, then the issue as to whether the guest 
was sufficiently forewarned so that under all the 
circumstances he was negligent in becoming or 
remaining a guest in the car should be submitted 
to the jury. He is not barred as a matter of law 
except where his knowledge of the physical in-
capacity of the driver and the surrounding cir-
cumstances are such that reasonable men could 
draw but one inference as to his negligence. 
* * * The issue, of assumption of risk should 
have be,en submitted to the jury." 
See also Franco v. Vakares, (Ariz.), 277 P. 812; 
Smart r. Masker, (Fla.), 113 So. 2d 414; Hernng v. 
Erland, (Fla.), 81 So. 2nd 645; William v. Owens, 85 Ga. 
App. 549, 69 SE2d 787; Besserman v. Hines, 219 Ill. App. 
606; K1·imse v. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co., 73 Ind. 
App. 537, 127 N.E. 837; Saxton v. Rose, (Miss.), 29 So.2d 
646; and Xardone v. Milton Fire Dist., 261 App. Div. 717, 
:27 NYS 2d 489. 
In nearly all of the above cases the appellate court 
held, lmder the evidence, that as ,a matter of law plaintiff 
was debarred from recovery. We believe that the facts 
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of this cas.e are -equally strong, and that the trial court 
would have been amply justified in granting defendant's 
motion for dire'Cted verdict. However, it is not now 
necessary to go that far. It is sufficient to hold that the 
finding of the jury is supported by competent and sub-
stantial evidence. 
The precise probJem does not appear to have been 
previously pres,ented to this court. However, in Muligarn 
v. Harward, 11 Ut. 2d 74, 355 P2d 62, this court indicated 
by a strong dictum that it would follow the line of rea-
soning of the cases above quoted: 
"Of course, if the plaintiff had known 
Harward was intoxicated at the time they em-
barked on the journey, he would probably he in 
the position of having assumed the risk." 
A similar expression is found in the earlier case of 
Balle v. Sm~th, (Ut.), 17 P.2d 2·2.4: 
"Where one rides with an intoxicated driver, 
or one who ... drives at .an excessive or unlawful 
rate of speed, and the guest, with knowledge of 
such condition of the driver or such negligent or 
unlawful acts without objection continues to ride 
in such automobile, and an accident happens 
which is caused or contributed to by such negli-
gence cannot recover.'' 
And in EserniJa v. Overland Moving Co., 120 Ut. 647, 
206 P .2d 621, the same principle was applied to a plain-
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tiff who rode and continued to ride with a driver, known 
by plaintiff to be in a sleepy condition. This court there 
held as a matter of law that plaintiff was debarred 
from recovery. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
Although plaintiff asserts prejudicial error in the 
court's stock instruction to the jury, defining among 
other things, negligence and contributory negligence, 
counsel devotes only one short par:agraph to the· support 
of this proposition and cites not a single authority-
statute, case or text, in support of his position. There-
fore. the contentjon does not merit extensive treatment. 
While it probably· would have been better had the 
court omitted the instruction with reference to ordinary 
negligence and con trihutory negligence, no harm could 
possibly have come to either party, in view of the fact 
that the ease was submitted to the jury upon special in-
terrogatories, and the jury was specifically required to 
find on the issues of intoxication, wilful misconduct, and 
assumption of risk. Each of these doctrines was fully 
explained to the jury in other instructions. The doc-
trine of wilful misconduct was further explained by the 
court in response to a question put by the jury during 
the course of its deliberations. It is inconceivable on the 
record before the court, that the jury could have been 
misled by the surplusage of instructions defining negli-
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gence and contributory negligence. We call the court's 
attention to the provisions of R.ule 61, which reads as 
follows: 
"No error in either the admission or the ex-
cluion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by 
the court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. 1The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the' proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties." 
The reasoning of this court in the recent Utah case 
of Hadley v. Wood, 9' Ut.2d 366, 345 P.2d 197, is applic-
able here. In that case the trial court withdrew from the 
jury the issue· of contributory negligence by reason of 
plaintiff's tender years. However, the court gave an 
instruction to the jury to the effect that there could be 
more than one legal cause of an accident, notwithstand-
ing that such instruction had become irrelevant in view 
of the withdrawal of the issue of contributory negligence 
from the jury. In holding that the presentation of the 
irrelevant instruction to the jury w.as harmless, this court 
said: 
·"Notwithstanding there is some justification 
for the charge that irrelevant instructions were 
given, if' they are viewed as. .a whole, as they 
should be, the issues were presented to the jury 
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fully and fairly and in such a manner that we see 
no prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff." 
CONCL,U8ION 
There was no error the court below. The court acted 
within the bounds of its discretion in submitting the case 
case to the jury on special interrogatories and plaintiff 
made no objection or exception thereto. The evidence 
abundantly supports the jury's finding that plaintiff 
vohmtarily assumed the risk in riding with a driver 
whom he knew, or should have known, had imbibed a 
sufficient amount of alcoholic beverage to become in-
toxicated. There was no prejudicial error in the instruc-
tions to the jury. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
·CHRIBTE,N8EN ANDI JENS.EN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for R{3Jspondents 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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